Barker

TF_Barker

Task Force Barker was in existence for only a few months and yet the compulsions of a few on March 16, 17 and 18, 1968 would
change the way America thought about the war in Vietnam. We must forever try to understand and hasten to avoid these war time acts.

The events of March 16, 17 and 18, 1968 around My Lai traumatized America. I was 19 clicks away when it happened and I didn't
even know about it for a year, yet I was still impacted by this event. I felt shame for the acts and empathy for the victims. I felt defensive
about the grunts and critical of the leadership. I am comforted to know that only a small percentage of the Americans involved felt compelled
to kill.One G.I. shot himself in the foot with a .45 cal. so he wouldn't have to shoot others. Many just said," no, I cannot obey an unlawfully
order." A helicopter pilot put his aircraft between grunts and fleeing villagers. These acts do not mitigate the rapes and murders that occurred
that day. Those who were there know what they did. The guilt and shame owned by the those compelled to rape and kill is surely greater than
any judgment we can bestow on them. For every person in My Lai who killed there were nine who did not kill. The tragic pain, trauma and
guilt over this event is shared by all. Tom Skiens

Four hours in My lai Video 1 thru 7 Four hours in My Lai, a case study This is a 21 page PDF document that loads rapidly.	Lt. Calley	The Peers report This is a 394 page PDF document. Depending on your computer speed the document may take 5 minutes to load.
4/3 staff journals for this time period. 17 pages and about 4 minutes load time. I think the fourth Battalion was in ready reserve to task Force Barker. Our TOC responded to the Task Force Dustoff requests	My Lai Detainee	Americal Div. Newsletter Spin, spin, spin and dozens of lies. A year later, one single truth would bring down this house of cards.
Operation Show Low March 1968	LTC Barker Chopper crash journals- 1 2 3	Operation Muscatine
The My Lai Monument	The Medina standard is based upon the massacre at My Lai which US captain Ernest Medina failed to prevent. It holds that a commanding officer, being aware of a human rights violation or a war crime, will be held criminally liable when he does not take action.	11TH Light Infantry Brigade Winners

Wikipedia My Lai	My Lai Courts Martial	MY Lai An Account	BBC My Lai	Morgana's view My Lai
Court TV My Lai	Infoplease My Lai	Answers My Lai	Blood and Fire My Lai	Amazon Books My Lai

Web Master ssgt@11THLIB.com

A letter to Oliver Stone…(should you seek this site)

SEE Stones Vietnam experience

We understand there may be a movie in the works regarding the events of 1968 at My Lai, RVN, or as we of the 11^th LIB
know it…Pinkville. There has been much reported and written over the years that has given VN vets in general, and we of the
11^th in particular, a negative face; one we do not deserve. Having been a member of the 4^th Bn / 3^rd infantry Regiment, I can
attest to having been called a “baby killer” based entirely on that unit association as well as just being a VN vet. Perhaps you
experienced the same?
I am hoping that your movie will not just be one more expose` that will further tarnish our unit and the men who served. There
would be no purpose for yet another sensationalist report.

I served as a medic and later, beginning in March 68, as a casualty reporter for our battalion and Task Force Barker. As
casualty Reporter it was my duty to assess, evaluate and interview the wounded, assess and evaluate the cause of death for
our KIA, and report to S-2.

I dealt with many of our troops who had been wounded or killed in and around My Lai. Many of these men were known
to me from our days of training at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.Those who were not severely wounded were highly agitated.
Through questioning I was able to extract the cause of their frustration. The stories were much the same: approach the ‘ville…take
SAF and mine casualties. Enter the ‘ville to be told, “No VC-No VC.” Leaving, they often took more casualties. Batangan
Peninsula was said to be a hot bed of NVA and VC activity. What I witnessed was a breakdown in the psychological, cultural,
and military discipline as these men returned repeatedly to the hornets’ nest of death and mayhem.

I do not condone what happened, but I do understand somewhat the emotional and mental breakdown that may have
exploded into a killing fury in the absence of leadership.

I hope that your movie will take this approach, in part, by exposing these elements of combat and the effect on the psyche.
My Lai was not the only horror of that war and American troops were not the only actors. I recall a night when the ER was
filled with wounded and GR with dead. Many had had their genitals cut away and stuffed into their mouths.I trust your movie
will be fair and accurate…and informative in a non-judgemental way.

R. Raitano
RVN 1967-68
Medic 4^th Bn / 3^rd Inf Rgt / 11^th LIB

Foxtrot sounds off

My name is Tom Skiens. I am the web master of the 11th LIB site and buffgrunt.com. I sailed to Nam aboard the USS
General Gordon and was with C 4/3 two Klicks north of LZ Buff on march 16, 1968.

I address these comments to the men of C 1/20 and B 4/3 on the possibility of a Stone movie.

You can remain silent gentlemen and others will speak for you. You can speak for yourself and they may twist your
words to suit their own purpose. These are hard choices but you have made hard choices before. You made hard choices
on March 16, 17, and 18th 1968. You made hard choices the night of March 16 when C 1/20 and B 4/3 shared
an RON. If you did not kill or rape on these days then I say speak up and tell your story. The world and America need to
know what you went through the two weeks leading up to this terrible event.

If you killed or raped that day then bunker up big time and remain in the shadows. Most people in America and the
world would never understand. They only want to judge and condemn. Most of them have never lived out of a rucksack
or thrown the body parts of a buddy on a poncho and dragged it to a chopper. It would do no good to step forward
now some 40 years later and point the finger at yourself as if to say, " I shot an unarmed Gook and raped a baby".
No one needs to know that now. God knows you have suffered enough. We are our own worst critics. We eat bullets
to end our pain. We destroy our own lives and laugh at those who suggest we take care of ourselves.

So if you," got some ", March 68, keep it to yourself so some legal freak don't get a hardon. If you were there but
did not rape or kill and simply did your job, then speak up so America can learn what you went through march 1968.

Respectfully
Tommy J Skiens

Hello,

I just discovered your site. You mentioned My Lai. I was assigned to the 52d MI Det, 11th LIB,
Americal and I agree with what you wrote.

LT "Bull",real name omitted for reasons of privacy, was the only member from the 52d Military
intellegance Detachment who was involved at My Lai. I went down to IPW expecting to help out
with interrogation as we were expecting some prisoners. The huey landed near the cage and Bull
came towards me. I said, "Bull where's the prisoners?" He stated that the village was abandoned
and empty, however he looked shocked and traumatized when I said, "you gotta be kidding me!"
He said, "No, that's the truth, it was empty." He walked around like a zombie appearing dazed. I
found out later in CONUS about what really occurred at My Lai. Bull never said another word
about My Lai throughout our tour.

While still at Schoffield Barracks, Bull temporarily ran our supply in the quad that LT Calley controlled.
LT Callley kicked my bunk and another guy's bunk over on a Saturday morning when I was asleep.
He left with CPT Medina saying he would return in 5 minutes for a full inspection. When he returned in
a rage with Medina observing his antics he got in my face assuming I was a private and called me "Private".
I told Calley, "Get in my face again and your going over the baloney!" Medina just stared and never said a
word. Calley went to Maj. Fletcher at 52d Military intellegance and complained about me telling him what
he could do to himself. I never saw Calley again after Maj. Fletcher informed the young LT. that not only
did he not have any authority over me but that I outranked him.

I was actually a Spec 5, but Maj. Fletcher told him I was a confidentual informant and said my title was "Mr."
When Calley demanded to know what my rank really was Maj. Fletcher told him he could not under AR-381-101
reveal my rank to him or to CPT Medina. Calley was infuriated and wouldn't give up. Maj. Fletcher then told him
that he needed to co-operate with CPT Smith and not to interfere with his duties or reveal my rank to anyone.

I wish today that I had tossed Calley over that balconey. I never saw him again in Vietnam, however, I did go to
CPT Medina for some support assistance, but he couldn't offer me any men because he had them on an operation
at My Lai.

No one said anything. I felt betrayed and shamed when I found out about My Lai after returning home. I read that
Bull took the "Fifth". I also heard from LT Greime, 52d MI, about a year ago that Bull had a lot of children of his
own (9?) and that he has suffered because of My Lai. He has never been quite the same sense March 16th 1968 .

Lynn Smith